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Abstract
In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean
preferences on a polytope in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each
profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. A single-best point is
a point which is the unique point at maximal distance from some other
point of the polytope. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto
optimal rule is a dictatorship unless the polytope has exactly two single-
best points or it has exactly four single-best points which form the vertices
of a rectangle. In the latter cases strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules
can be obtained by committee voting (simple games) between the single-
best alternatives. This framework models situations where public bads
such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located
within a confined region.
JEL Classification: D71
Keywords: Single-dipped preferences, strategy-proofness, committee voting
1 Introduction
Consider the problem of locating a windmill park, garbage dumping ground,
heavy industry, or nuclear plant within a confined area, such as a city, province,
or country. These are examples of public bads: people agree on their usefulness
or even necessity but typically do not want them in their backyards. In this
paper we assume that the public bad is to be located within a given region – a
subset of the plane – and that the location is determined by voting among a set
of agents (for instance, inhabitants of the region, or political representatives).
Each agent is characterized by a Euclidean single-dipped preference: there is
a worst point, the dip, which is a specific point of the region, and preference
increases with the Euclidean distance from this dip. A vote then consists of
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reporting one’s dip. Typically, these dips are private knowledge: an agent’s
dip could coincide with his residence, the school of his children, an important
natural resource, etc. In order for the location of the public bad to be based
on the right information about the agents’ preferences the (voting) rule should
be strategy-proof: no agent should be able to achieve a location farther away
from his true dip by not reporting truthfully. Also, we will require the rule to
be Pareto optimal: it should not assign a location for which there is another
location at least as distant for all and strictly farther away for some agents,
given the reported dips.
In this paper we assume that the region is a two-dimensional polytope A, i.e.,
the convex hull of at least three but finitely many points, which are the extreme
points of the polytope. An important concept is that of a single-best point, i.e.,
a point of A that is the unique point at maximal distance from some other point
of A. Single-best points are always extreme points, although not every extreme
point is necessarily a single-best point. For instance, if the boundary of A is
a triangle with vertices a, b, and c, then these three points are the single-best
points if the triangle is acute. However, if the angle at a is right then a can be
a best point but never a single-best point, and if this angle is obtuse then a is
not even a best point.
We assume that there are n ≥ 2 agents; a profile is a vector of n points of A –
interpreted as a vector of reported dips – and a rule assigns a point of A to each
profile. Our main results are as follows. If A does not have exactly two single-
best points or if A does not have exactly four single-best points which form the
vertices of a rectangle, then a strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule must be
dictatorial: there is a fixed agent d such that the rule always assigns a point
at maximal distance from d’s dip. This result is obtained by proving that the
set of decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter and, in particular, closed under taking
intersections. The last property does not hold if A has exactly two single-best
points or exactly four single-best points which are the vertices of a rectangle.
For the case that A has exactly two single-best points a and b – which means,
roughly, that A is sufficiently flat with a and b as ‘end points’ – we characterize
all strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules under a few mild additional (tie-
breaking) assumptions: such rules are described by committee (simple game)
voting between a and b. Similarly, for the case where A has exactly four single-
best points which are the vertices of a rectangle, we can obtain strategy-proof
and Pareto optimal rules by committee voting between the upper and lower
and between the left and right vertices of the rectangle; for this case we content
ourselves by giving an example.
The message of the paper is therefore that dictatorship can be avoided if the
region is sufficiently flat (in terms of width) or if we can identify four locations
which are the vertices of a rectangle and which are the only single-best points.
Since some parts of the proof rely on the finiteness of the set of extreme
points of a region A, extension of our results to general compact convex set does
not seem straightforward. In a companion note (O¨ztu¨rk, Peters, and Storcken,
2012) we show that dictatorship continues to hold when A is a disc (a circle and
its inside) but this needs a separate proof.
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Related literature To the dictatorship part of our results the classical work
of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) does not directly apply since we
do not have full preference domains. An exception is the acute triangle: if we
know that the rule assigns a vertex then in this case dictatorship follows from
Gibbard-Satterthwaite since single-dipped preferences generate the full domain
of six (strict) preferences over the vertices (see the end of Section 3).
Although single-dipped and single-peaked preferences are both special cases
of value restrictions (Inada, 1964) their consequences in spatial models like ours
seem to be quite different. In particular, under single-dipped preferences Pareto
optimality of a rule, but also weaker conditions such as unanimity, force the
outcome of the rule to be on the boundary of the region under consideration –
which is also why the restriction to compact sets is natural in the present frame-
work. As a result, under single-dipped preferences much is going to depend on
the shape of the boundary of the region. Generally speaking, single-peakedness
of preferences seems to allow for more possibilities and to lead less frequently
to dictatorship (Black, 1948; Moulin, 1980; Border and Jordan, 1983).
In spite of its apparent relevance, existing work on collective decision mak-
ing in the presence of single-dipped preferences is relatively limited. As far as
we know ours is the first paper to study strategy-proofness under single-dipped
preferences in two-dimensional space. The one-dimensional case has been stud-
ied before. Peremans and Storcken (1999) characterize all strategy-proof rules
for the case that A is an arbitrary subset of the real line and preferences are
single-dipped (and not necessarily symmetric). An implication of their work is
that individual and coalitional strategy-proofness are equivalent in this model.
Also Barbera`, Berga, and Moreno (2009) reach this conclusion and sharpen the
bounds on the range of strategy-proof rules, depending on different subclasses
of single-dipped preferences. Manjunath (2009) specifically studies unanimous
and strategy-proof rules defined on a real interval. Thus, all these works concern
the location of a public bad where the region A is one-dimensional.
The private good case with single-dipped preferences is considered in Klaus,
Peters, and Storcken (1997), which deals with the division of a perfectly divis-
ible commodity. Klaus (2001) considers the case where this commodity is an
indivisible object and has to be allocated to one of the agents. Ehlers (2002)
considers the probabilistic allocation of an indivisible object.
The proof of the dictatorship result based on decisive coalitions and ultra-
filters has been used before, see Kirman and Sondermann (1972) and Hansson
(1976).
Finally, there is a literature on mechanism design for the location of pub-
lic bads when monetary transfers are allowed, see for instance Kunreuther and
Kleindorfer (1986) or, more recently, Lescop (2007) or Besfamille and Lozach-
meur (2010).
Organization of the paper Section 2 starts with notations, the basic model,
and some preliminary results. In Section 3 we derive the dictatorship result,
and in Section 4 we consider the non-dictatorship cases. Section 5 concludes.
3
2 Notations, basic model, and preliminaries
We start by fixing some notations to be used throughout the paper.
2.1 Notations
For a subset X of R2 (endowed with the usual topology) we denote by ∂X its
boundary, by X◦ its interior, and by X its closure.
Let a, b, c ∈ R2 be three different points. Then [a, b] denotes the closed line
segment between points a and b, ]a, b[ the (relatively) open line segment between
a and b, and [a, b[ and ]a, b] the two half open line segments. The midpoint of
[a, b] is denoted by ma,b and its perpendicular bisector by ℓa,b. For x ∈ R
2 we
denote by σa,b(x) the reflection of x in the line ℓa,b, i.e., ℓa,b is the perpendicular
bisector of [x, σa,b(x)].
If a, b, and c are non-collinear we denote ma,b,c = ℓa,b∩ℓb,c∩ℓa,c (and regard
ma,b,c as a point rather than a set). Further, ℓ(a, b) denotes the straight line
through the points a and b.
The Euclidean distance between a and b is denoted by ||a − b||. A straight
line ℓ divides the plane R2 into two half-planes. For a /∈ ℓ, H(ℓ, a) indicates
the closed half-plane containing a; we write H◦(ℓ, a) for the open half-plane,
thus H◦(ℓ, a) = H(ℓ, a)◦. The circle with center a and radius r ≥ 0 is denoted
by ⊙(a, r), hence ⊙(a, r) = {x ∈ R2 : ||a − x|| = r}. For x, y ∈ R2 on the
same circle with center a ∈ R2, we write [a;xay] for the arc between x and y,
that is, [a;xay] = ⊙(a, ||a − x||)\H◦(ℓ(x, y), a) if a is not on ℓ(x, y), otherwise
[a;xay] = ⊙(a, ||a− x||).
For an arbitrary set D we denote by |D| its cardinality.
2.2 The basic model
We next formulate the basic model. There is a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} (n ≥ 2)
of agents and a compact subset A ⊆ R2 of alternatives. Each agent is endowed
with a (Euclidean single-dipped) preference Rx, x ∈ A, defined as follows: for
all y, z ∈ A, (y, z) ∈ Rx if ||x − y|| ≥ ||x − z||. The alternative x is the dip
of preference Rx. Clearly, preference Rx is completely determined by its dip;
therefore, if convenient, we will denote a preference by its dip. An element
p = (p(1), . . . , p(n)) ∈ AN , where p(i) is the dip of agent i, is called a profile
(of single-dipped preferences). A social choice function or simply rule is a map
ϕ : AN → A. We are interested in rules that satisfy the following two properties.
Rule ϕ is called
[PO] Pareto optimal if for every profile p ∈ AN , every agent i ∈ N , and every
alternative a ∈ A with ||p(i)− a|| > ||p(i)−ϕ(p)|| there is an agent j ∈ N
such that ||p(j)− a|| < ||p(j)− ϕ(p)||;
[SP] strategy-proof if for every agent i in N and all profiles p, q ∈ AN , with
q(j) = p(j) for all j ∈ N\{i}, we have ||p(i)− ϕ(p)|| ≥ ||p(i)− ϕ(q)||.
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The interpretation of Pareto optimality is as usual, and strategy-proofness
(also as usual) implies that no agent can improve the outcome by misreporting
his preference.
A subset of N is called a coalition. As the reader may verify, strategy-
proofness is equivalent to the following condition. Rule ϕ is called
[ISP] intermediate strategy-proof if for every coalition S ⊆ N and all profiles
p, q ∈ AN such that p(j) = q(j) for all j ∈ N\S and there is an alternative
a with p(i) = a for all i ∈ S, we have ||a− ϕ(p)|| ≥ ||a− ϕ(q)||.
Often ISP will be used instead of SP without explicit mentioning.
2.3 Preliminaries
Let S ⊆ N be a coalition and let a, b ∈ A. By (aS , bN\S) ∈ AN we denote the
profile p with p(i) = a for all i ∈ S and p(i) = b for all i ∈ N \ S. (If S = N
we usually write aN instead of (aN , b∅).) To such a two-dip profile a Pareto
optimal rule always assigns a boundary point, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 2.1 Let a, b ∈ A, S ⊆ N , and p = (aS , bN\S). Let ϕ : AN → A be a
Pareto optimal rule. Then ϕ(p) ∈ ∂A.
Proof. Let ℓ = ℓ(a, b) if a 6= b and let ℓ be an arbitrary straight line through a if
a = b. Let x be the intersection of ℓ and the line ℓ′ through ϕ(p) perpendicular
to ℓ. Now for points c on ℓ′ such that ϕ(p) ∈ ]c, x], it follows that ||a − c|| >
||a − ϕ(p)|| and ||b − c|| > ||b − ϕ(p)||. Hence, by Pareto optimality we must
have c /∈ A, so that ϕ(p) cannot be an interior point of A. Hence ϕ(p) ∈ ∂A.
Observe that the proof of this lemma does not use the compactness of the
set A. Thus, the lemma justifies our restriction to compact sets.
For a preference Ra, the set of best alternatives is denoted by b(Ra) or by
b(a), i.e., b(Ra) = b(a) = {y ∈ A : ||a−y|| ≥ ||a− z|| for all z ∈ A}. A coalition
S ⊆ N is decisive (given a rule ϕ) if ϕ(p) ∈ b(Ra) for all a ∈ A and all p ∈ A
N
with p(i) = a for all i ∈ S. Clearly, if S is decisive and S ⊆ T ⊆ N , then T is
decisive. A rule ϕ is dictatorial if there is a dictator, i.e., an agent d ∈ N such
that {d} is decisive.
A collection W of subsets of N is called an ultrafilter on N if for all subsets
S, T ⊆ N we have (i) ∅ /∈ W, (ii) if S, T ∈ W, then S ∩ T ∈ W, and (iii) S ∈ W
or N \ S ∈ W. We have the following familiar property.
Lemma 2.2 Let W be an ultrafilter on N . Then there exists a unique d ∈ N
such that {d} ∈ W.
Proof. By properties (i) and (ii) of an ultrafilter there can be at most one such
d. If N \ {i} ∈ W for all i ∈ N then ∩i∈NN \ {i} ∈ W by (ii), but this violates
(i) since ∩i∈NN \ {i} = ∅. Hence, there must be a d ∈ N with N \ {d} /∈ W, so
by (iii) we have {d} ∈ W.
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3 Dictatorship
Throughout this section, the set A is a polytope with non-empty interior, i.e.,
the convex hull of a finite set C = {c1, c2, ..., ck} ⊆ R
2 with k ≥ 3 where all
alternatives in C are extreme points of A. Further, ϕ : AN → A is a strategy-
proof and Pareto optimal rule.
We start by showing that only extreme points can be boundary outcomes
of ϕ.
Lemma 3.1 Let p ∈ AN and ϕ(p) ∈ ∂A. Then ϕ(p) ∈ C.
Proof. Let ϕ(p) = c. To the contrary suppose that c /∈ C. Then c ∈ ]c˜L, c˜R[⊆
∂A for some c˜L, c˜R ∈ C. Let ℓ be the line through c perpendicular to ]c˜L, c˜R[.
Line ℓ divides A in a left part and a right part, which we denote by L and R
respectively, more precisely, L = H◦(ℓ, c˜L) ∩ A and R = H
◦(ℓ, c˜R) ∩ A. For
x in ∂A ∩ L consider the perpendicular bisector ℓx,c of [x, c]. If x /∈ [c˜L, c], let
dx be the point of intersection of ℓx,c and ∂A which is not in H
◦(ℓ(x, c), c˜L);
if x ∈ [c˜L, c], let dx be the point of intersection of ℓx,c and ∂A which is not in
[c˜L, c].
Consider the set Z of points z ∈ C ∩ L such that dz is in between dz′ and c
for all z′ ∈ C ∩L on the path along the boundary of A passing c˜L before c. If Z
consists of a unique point then call this point cL; otherwise, let cL be the point
of Z such that z is in between cL and c for all other points z ∈ Z.
1 We write dL
instead of dcL . Clearly, dL ∈ ∂A ∩ L since dc˜L ∈ ∂A ∩ L. Now the choice of cL
implies that dL ∈ H(ℓz,c, z) for all z ∈ C ∩ L, hence that ||dL − z|| ≤ ||dL − c||
for all z ∈ C ∩ L. In turn, this implies ||dL − x|| ≤ ||dL − c|| for all x ∈ L.
Let SL = {i ∈ N : p(i) ∈ H
◦(ℓcL,c, cL)}. Since ||dL − c˜L|| ≤ ||dL − c|| and
ℓc˜L,c ∩A ⊆ L it follows that ℓcL,c ∩A ⊆ L. Pareto optimality of ϕ implies that
either SL is non-empty or p(i) ∈ ℓcL,c∩A for all i ∈ N (since otherwise cL would
Pareto dominate c = ϕ(p)). Now similarly we can define cR, dR and SR for the
right part of A and have by Pareto optimality that either SR is non-empty or
p(i) ∈ ℓcR,c ∩ A for all i ∈ N . Since L ∩ R = ∅ we have that ℓcL,c ∩ A and
ℓcR,c ∩A are disjoint. This implies that both SL and SR are non-empty.
Now consider the profile qL with qL(i) = p(i) for all i /∈ SL and qL(i) = dL
for all i ∈ SL. With the aid of the following claim we will prove that ϕ(qL) = cL.
Claim Let v, w ∈ AN , i ∈ SL, and a ∈ H
◦(ℓcL,c, cL) with v(i) = a, w(i) = dL,
v(j) = w(j) for all j ∈ N \ {i}, and ϕ(v) ∈ [dL; cLac]. Then ϕ(w) ∈ [dL; cLac].
To prove this, first note that ||a− x|| ≤ ||a− c|| for all x ∈ [dL; cLac]; this is
so since a ∈ H(ℓ(c, dL), cL) because c, dL ∈ ∂A, and therefore a ∈ H(ℓx,c, x) for
all x ∈ [dL; cLac]. (See Fig. 1(a).) Hence SP of ϕ implies ||a− c|| ≥ ||a−ϕ(w)||
otherwise agent i could manipulate from v to w. Again by strategy-proofness
we have ||dL − ϕ(w)|| ≥ ||dL − c|| otherwise agent i could manipulate from
w to v. Suppose that ||dL − ϕ(w)|| > ||dL − c||. Then, since cL ∈ Z, we have
1For a polytope of which the boundary is a regular polygon one can show that cL = c˜L.
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c
x
cL
a
ℓx,c
(a)
dL
c
cL
a
c˜L
ϕ(w)
ℓ(dL, c)
ℓc,ϕ(w)
(b)
Figure 1: Illustrating the proof of Lemma 3.1
ϕ(w) ∈ R. Since dL and c are both inH(ℓc,ϕ(w), c) we have A∩H(ℓ(dL, c), c˜L) ⊆
H(ℓc,ϕ(w), c). Since a ∈ A ∩ H
◦(ℓ(dL, c), c˜L) it follows that a ∈ H
◦(ℓc,ϕ(w), c),
contradicting ||a − c|| ≥ ||a − ϕ(w)||. (See Fig. 1(b).) Therefore we must have
||dL − ϕ(w)|| = ||dL − c||.
Now the two circles ⊙(dL, ||dL− c||) and ⊙(a, ||a− c||) intersect in c and say
c′. Since ||a − c|| ≥ ||a − ϕ(w)|| and ||dL − ϕ(w)|| = ||dL − c|| it follows that
ϕ(w) ∈ [dL; c
′
ac]. But by the choice of cL we have [dL; c
′
ac]∩A = [dL; cLac]∩A.
Therefore ϕ(w) ∈ [dL; cLac], which completes the proof of the Claim.
Repeated application of the Claim yields that ϕ(qL) ∈ [dL; cLac]. For all
x ∈ [dL; cLac] we have by construction that H(ℓcL,x, cL) ∩ A is a subset of
H(ℓcL,c, cL) ∩ A and therefore contains no dips of the profile qL other than
dL. Since SR 6= ∅, it follows that for profile qL the point cL Pareto dominates
dominates all x ∈ [dL; cLac] with x 6= cL. Hence, ϕ(qL) = cL.
Next consider the profile r with r(i) = dR for all i ∈ SR and r(i) = qL(i) for
all i /∈ SR. SP of ϕ implies that ||dR − ϕ(r)|| ≥ ||dR − cL||. But clearly dR ∈
H◦(ℓcL,c, c) and therefore ||dR−c|| < ||dR−cL||. Hence, ||dR−ϕ(r)|| > ||dR−c||
and by the the definition of dR (similar to dL above) ||dR − c|| ≥ ||dR − x|| for
all x ∈ R. This implies ϕ(r) ∈ L. By a completely analogous argument, now
starting on the right part of A with a profile qR, we can show that ϕ(r) ∈ R.
Since L ∩ R = ∅, we have a contradiction, which completes the proof of the
lemma.
The next lemma follows by combining Lemmas 2.1 and 3.1.
Lemma 3.2 Let a, b ∈ A and S ⊆ N . Then ϕ(aS , bN\S) ∈ C.
For a subset B of A let AB denote the set of alternatives for which B is
exactly the set of best alternatives, i.e.,
AB = {x ∈ A : b(x) = B}.
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For a singleton {a} we write Aa instead of A{a}. We can make the following
observations. If B ⊆ A and B 6⊆ C, then AB = ∅. If B = {a, b} for some distinct
a, b ∈ C then AB ⊆ ℓa,b and if B = {a, b, c} for some distinct a, b, c ∈ C then
AB ⊆ ℓa,b ∩ ℓb,c. Moreover, if Aa 6= ∅ for some a ∈ C then Aa is convex. This
can be seen as follows. Let x, y ∈ Aa and let b ∈ A\{a}, then x, y ∈ H
◦(ℓa,b, b),
hence z ∈ H◦(ℓa,b, b) for any convex combination z of x and y, so b /∈ b(z).
Since b was arbitrary and b(z) 6= ∅, this implies that z ∈ Aa. Let
B = {a ∈ A : Aa 6= ∅}.
Elements of B are called single-best alternatives. Combining our observations
we see that for each a ∈ B the set Aa is a convex polygon which is open relative
to A, and that A = ∪x∈BAx.
The following two lemmas establish further facts about alternatives in B.
Lemma 3.3 Let a, b, and c be three distinct alternatives in B. Then ma,b,c
exists and ma,b,c ∈ A
◦.
Proof. Since a, b, c ∈ C they are not collinear and thus ma,b,c exists. The
straight lines ℓa,b, ℓa,c, and ℓb,c intersect at ma,b,c and determine six open non-
empty regions which divide A◦ \ (ℓa,b ∪ ℓa,c ∪ ℓb,c) into disjoint sets. A single
dipped preference Rx is constant over a, b, and c as long as x stays in one of
these regions. Call these regions Vabc, Vbac, Vbca, Vcba, Vcab and Vacb; for x ∈ Vabc
we have that a is (strictly) preferred over b and b over c according to Rx, and
similarly for the other five regions. Now Aa ⊆ (Vabc∪Vacb∪ ℓb,c)
◦∩A. Since Aa
is non-empty we have that (Vabc ∪ Vacb ∪ ℓb,c)
◦ ∩ A is non-empty and therefore
(Vabc ∪ Vacb ∪ ℓb,c)
◦ ∩ A◦ is non-empty. Similarly (Vbca ∪ Vbac ∪ ℓa,c)
◦ ∩ A◦ and
(Vcab∪Vcba∪ℓa,b)
◦∩A◦ are non-empty. Take points xa, xb, xc in these respective
regions, then ma,b,c is in the convex hull of these three points and is therefore
an interior point of A.
Lemma 3.4 Let a ∈ B. Then A◦ \Aa is connected.
Proof. If A◦ \ Aa = Ab for some b ∈ B we are done because Ab is obviously
connected as it is convex. Therefore let y, z ∈ A◦ with y ∈ Ab and z ∈ Ac for
some distinct b, c ∈ B \ {a}. Since A◦ ⊆ ∪{Ax : x ∈ B} it is sufficient to prove
that there is a path in A◦ \ Aa connecting y and z.
2 Lemma 3.3 implies that
ma,b,c ∈ A
◦. Convexity of A implies that A◦ is convex. Hence, [y,ma,b,c] ∈ A
◦
and [z,ma,b,c] ∈ A
◦. With notations as in the proof of Lemma 3.3 we may further
conclude that [y,ma,b,c[ ⊆ (Vbca∪Vbac∪ℓa,c)
◦ and [z,ma,b,c[ ⊆ (Vcab∪Vcba∪ℓa,b)
◦.
Since Aa ⊆ (Vabc ∪Vacb ∪ ℓb,c)
◦ ∩A and (Vabc ∪Vacb ∪ ℓb,c)
◦ is disjoint from both
(Vbca ∪ Vbac ∪ ℓa,c)
◦ and (Vcab ∪ Vcba ∪ ℓa,b)
◦ it follows that we can construct
a path from y to z in A◦ \ Aa, as follows. Choose points y
′ ∈ [y,ma,b,c[ and
z′ ∈ ]ma,b,c, z] close enough to ma,b,c such that there is a path P from y
′ to z′ in
A◦ disjoint from Aa; then the desired path is [y, y
′]∪P ∪ [z′, z]. (See Fig. 2.)
2I.e. the graph of a continuous function [0, 1] → A with 0 7→ y and 1 7→ z.
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Figure 2: Illustrating the proof of Lemma 3.4: path between y and z; m = ma,b,c
In what follows we often use a notation like R = ...x...yz... (x, y, z ∈ C) to
express that, in the preference R, x is strictly preferred to y, and y to z such
that other alternatives in C are either above y or below z in preference. The
following lemma is a simple consequence of (intermediate) strategy-proofness.
We leave its proof to the reader.
Lemma 3.5 Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , p, q ∈ AN and x, y ∈ C with x 6= y such that (i)
p(j) = q(j) for all j ∈ N \ S; (ii) p(i) = p(j) and q(i) = q(j) for all i, j ∈ S;
(iii) for all i ∈ S, p(i) and q(i) order the alternatives of C strictly and coincide
on C except for a swap between x and y: p(i) = ...xy..., q(i) = ...yx...; and (iv)
ϕ(p), ϕ(q) ∈ C, ϕ(p) 6= ϕ(q). Then x = ϕ(p) and y = ϕ(q).
Lemma 3.5 says that if an agent’s preference changes by swapping two al-
ternatives in C while not changing the (strict) order between other alternatives
in C, and if therefore the alternative assigned by the rule changes, then the two
swapped alternatives must be the alternatives assigned by the rule.3
The next result can be interpreted as saying that ϕ leaves no room for
compromising at two-dip profiles.
Lemma 3.6 Let S ⊆ N , a, b ∈ B, x ∈ Aa, y ∈ Ab, and p = (x
S , yN\S) ∈ AN .
Then ϕ(p) ∈ {a, b}.
Proof. If a = b then the claim in the lemma follows from Pareto-optimality.
Thus, let a 6= b and suppose that ϕ(p) = c /∈ {a, b}. We derive a contradiction.
Pareto optimality implies Rx = a...c...b... and Ry = b...c...a... We take a path
from x to c with the properties that (i) along this path, c can only become
worse compared to other elements of C; (ii) along this path the preference over
elements of C changes by swaps of at most two alternatives at the same time;
and (iii) along this path preferences over C are strict except at swaps as in (ii).
Formally, this path is the graph of a continuous function π from [0, 1] to A with
3This is a restricted version of (Maskin) monotonicity, which is implied by strategy-
proofness.
9
π(0) = x and π(1) = c such that (i) for all t1 < t2 and z ∈ C, if (z, c) ∈ Rpi(t1)
then (z, c) ∈ Rpi(t2) and (c, z) /∈ Rpi(t2) ; (ii) for all t ∈ [0, 1] there are no distinct
z, z′, z′′ ∈ C such that π(t) ∈ ℓz,z′ ∩ ℓz,z′′ ; and (iii) there are (only) finitely
many t for which π(t) ∈ ℓz,z′ for some z, z
′ ∈ C. We call a pair Rpi(t1), Rpi(t2) an
‘elementary change’ if the latter preference arises from the former after swapping
two adjacent alternatives in C.
Let pt = (π(t)S , yN\S). Then ϕ(p1) 6= c since c is not Pareto optimal at
p1. Thus, there must be a first elementary change such that ϕ(pt1) = c and
ϕ(pt2) = d 6= c. By Lemma 3.5 this implies that Rpi(t1) = ...cd... whereas
Rpi(t2) = ...dc...
Now there are two cases.
Case 1 Ry = b...d...c...a....
Then in the same way as above we can find a path ρ from y to c, profiles
qt = (π(t1)
S , ρ(t)N\S) and t3 and t4 such that ϕ(q
t3) = c, ϕ(qt4) = e 6= c
and Rρ(t3) and Rρ(t4) form an elementary change swapping c and e. Consider
r = (π(t2)
S , ρ(t4)
N\S) and ut = (π(t)S , ρ(t3)
N\S) for t ∈ [t1, t2]. So, ϕ(u
t1) =
ϕ(qt3) = c. Let ϕ(r) = f . Note that Rρ(t3) = ...d...ce... and Rρ(t4) = ...d...ec....
Since ϕ(ut1) = c it follows by Pareto optimality and Lemma 3.5 that ϕ(ut2) = d.
Summarizing we have:
ut1 = qt3 qt4
i ∈ S ut1(i) = Rpi(t1) = ...cd... q
t4(i) = Rpi(t1) = ...cd...
i ∈ N \ S ut1(i) = Rρ(t3) = ...d...ce... q
t4(i) = Rρ(t4) = ...d...ec...
ϕ(ut1) = c ϕ(qt4) = e
ut2 r
i ∈ S ut2(i) = Rpi(t2) = ...dc... r(i) = Rpi(t2) = ...dc...
i ∈ N \ S ut2(i) = Rρ(t3) = ...d...ce... r(i) = Rρ(t4) = ...d...ec...
ϕ(ut2) = d ϕ(r) = f
There are two subcases.
Subcase d 6= f . Comparing ut2 and r, Lemma 3.5 implies Rρ(t3) = ...df...ce...
and Rρ(t4) = ...fd...ec... So c, d, e, and f are all different. Comparing q
t4 and
r, Lemma 3.5 implies (i) Rpi(t1) = ...ef...cd... and Rpi(t2) = ...fe...dc... or (ii)
Rpi(t1) = ...cd...ef... and Rpi(t2) = ...dc...fe... But (i) implies that ϕ(u
t1) = c is
Pareto dominated by f at ut1 , a contradiction; and (ii) implies that ϕ(qt4) = e
is Pareto dominated by d at qt4 , likewise a contradiction. So this subcase cannot
occur.
Subcase d = f . Comparing qt4 and r, Lemma 3.5 implies Rpi(t1) = ...ed...
and Rpi(t2) = ...de... This implies the contradiction c = e and therefore also this
subcase cannot occur. This ends the proof of Case 1.
Case 2 Ry = b...c...d...a....
By interchanging the roles of c and d and thus those of Rpi(t1) and Rpi(t2),
and then proceeding like in Case 1, we derive a similar contradiction.
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Call a coalition S ⊆ N quasi-decisive (given ϕ) if ϕ(p) = a for all a, b ∈ A
and every profile p = (xS , yN\S) with x ∈ Aa and y ∈ Ab.
Lemma 3.7 Let |B| ≥ 3. Then for every S ⊆ N , either S or N \ S is quasi-
decisive.
Proof. Let S ⊆ N . If S = N or S = ∅ then we are done by Pareto optimality.
So assume S 6= ∅, N . Clearly, S and N \ S cannot both be quasi-decisive. Let
a, b be two different elements of B, and let x ∈ Aa, y ∈ Ab, and p = (x
S , yN\S).
By Lemma 3.6, ϕ(p) ∈ {a, b}. Without loss of generality assume that ϕ(p) = a.
Take c, d ∈ B, v ∈ Ac and w ∈ Ad arbitrary, and let q = (v
S , wN\S). It is
sufficient to prove that ϕ(q) = c. By Pareto optimality we may assume that
c 6= d. Lemma 3.6 implies ϕ(q) ∈ {c, d}. We proceed in four steps.
Step 1 Assume v = x.
Then, since v = x we have c = a. If also b = d, then ϕ(q) = c = a
otherwise coalition N \ S could manipulate from p to q and obtain d = b. So
assume b 6= d. By Lemma 3.4 there is a path from y to w disjoint from Aa.
Along this path we can find points y = u1, u2, . . . , uk = w (k ≥ 2) such that
ut ∈ Aft , ft ∈ B, for t = 1, . . . , k (so f1 = b, fk = d) and such that for
every t = 1, . . . , k − 1 we have Rut |B = ftft+1... and Rut+1 |B = ft+1ft...
4
For every t = 1, . . . , k let pt = (xS , u
N\S
t ). Thus, p
1 = p and pk = q. Since
ϕ(p1) = a, f1, f2 6= a, Ru2 |B = f2f1..., and ϕ(p
2) ∈ {a, f2} by Lemma 3.6, we
have by strategy-proofness that ϕ(p2) = a, since otherwise coalition N \S could
manipulate from p1 = p to p2, obtaining f2 instead of a. Similarly, it follows
from this that ϕ(p3) = a and so on, so that a = ϕ(pk) = ϕ(q).
Step 2 Assume v 6= x and d 6= a.
Consider p′ = (xS , wN\S). Then Step 1 implies ϕ(p′) = a. By Step 1 applied
to p′ and q, if ϕ(q) = d then ϕ(p′) = d, a contradiction since d 6= a. Hence
ϕ(q) = c.
Step 3 Assume y = v, w = x.
Let e ∈ B\{a, b} and u ∈ Ae. Then ϕ(p) = ϕ(x
S , yN\S) = a implies by Step
1 that ϕ(xS , uN\S) = a. In turn, by Step 2 this implies that ϕ(yS , uN\S) = b,
which by Step 1 again yields ϕ(q) = ϕ(yS , xN\S) = b. Since y = v, we have
b = c, so ϕ(q) = c.
Step 4 Assume v 6= x, d = a.
Then ϕ(p) = ϕ(xS , yN\S) = a implies by Step 3 that ϕ(yS , xN\S) = b,
hence by Step 1 we obtain ϕ(yS , wN\S) = b. If y = v, hence b = c, we have
ϕ(q) = ϕ(vS , wN\S) = ϕ(yS , wN\S) = b = c. If y 6= v then d = a 6= b and Step
2 imply ϕ(q) = ϕ(vS , wN\S) = c.
Since the case v = x is covered in Step 1, the case v 6= x and d 6= a in Step 2,
and the case v 6= x and d = a in Step 4, all cases are covered, so the proof is
complete.
4Rx|D denotes the restriction of preference Rx to D ⊆ A.
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Lemma 3.8 Let |B| ≥ 3. Then for every S ⊆ N , either S or N \S is decisive.
Proof. Let S ⊆ N . Clearly, S and N \ S cannot both be decisive. By Lemma
3.7 either S or N \ S is quasi-decisive. Assume that S is quasi-decisive, the
other case is analogous. Consider a profile p with p(i) = x for all i ∈ S such
that x ∈ Aa for some a ∈ B. We first prove that ϕ(p) = a. Take a d ∈ B such
that a ∈ ∂Ad, and take a v ∈ Ad. Let r = (x
S , vN\S). Quasi-decisiveness of
S implies that ϕ(r) = a. By applying intermediate strategy-proofness to the
profiles r and p we obtain ||v−a|| ≥ ||v−ϕ(p)||. Since we can take v as close to
a as desired, this implies ϕ(p) = a. Finally, let q be a profile with q(i) = y ∈ A
for all i ∈ S, and suppose that ϕ(q) /∈ b(y). Then take b ∈ b(y) ∩ B (this is
possible since A = ∪{Ax : x ∈ B}) and z ∈ A such that z ∈ Ab. By the first
part of the proof, ϕ(q′) = b where q′(i) = z for all i ∈ S and q′(i) = q(i) for all
i ∈ N \ S. Then S can manipulate from q to q′, violating (intermediate) SP.
In what follows we pin down those polytopes A for which the intersection
of two decisive sets is again decisive. Call a finite subset of R2 rectangular if
it consists of exactly four points which are the vertices of one and the same
rectangle.
Lemma 3.9 Let the following conditions hold:
(i) |B| ≥ 3.
(ii) There are distinct a, b, c ∈ B such that ma,b,c ∈ ∂Aa ∩ A
◦ and such that
there is no x ∈ B for which {a, b, c, x} is rectangular.
Let S, T ⊆ N be both decisive. Then S ∩ T is decisive.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary (cf. Lemma 3.8), that N\(S ∩ T ) is decisive.
Then we have a partition X = S ∩ T , Y = S \ T and Z = N \ S of N such that
X, Y and Z are not decisive. Hence any union of two of these sets, being the
complement of the third one, is decisive. We will derive a contradiction.
Let a, b and c be as in (ii) in the statement of the lemma. We choose a˜ ∈ A◦
close to a and b, c, ab, ac ∈ A
◦ close to m := ma,b,c (how close will be specified
below) with
Rb = ba...c...
Rc = ca...b...
Rab = ab...c...
Rac = ac...b...
Ra˜ = ...c...b...a
and such that all these preferences (restricted to C) are strict. (This is possible
in particular since ma,b,c ∈ ∂Aa∩A
◦. (See Fig. 3(a).) If â cannot be chosen this
way then we choose it such that Râ = ...b...c...a and proceed analogously.) By
choosing these points close enough to a and m, respectively, we have that for
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Figure 3: Illustrating the proof of Lemma 3.9
any profile q with dips at these points, any alternative in A◦ is Pareto dominated
by a boundary point. Hence, by Lemma 3.1, ϕ(q) ∈ C for such profiles q. In
particular, ϕ assigns an alternative in C to any of the following profiles:
p = (a˜X , b
Y
, cZ)
pab = (a˜X , aYb , c
Z)
pac = (a˜X , b
Y
, aZc )
r = (a˜X , aYb , a
Z
c ) .
Claim ϕ(p) ∈ {a, b, c}.
Let ϕ(p) = x, ϕ(pab) = y and ϕ(pac) = z. Since Y ∪ Z is decisive and since
ab, ac ∈ Aa, we have by strategy-proofness that ϕ(r) = a.
First consider r and pab . By Lemma 3.5 it follows that the first change,
starting from below, in the preferences Rac and Rc must be a swap between
ϕ(r) and ϕ(pab). Since ϕ(r) = a, this implies that either (i.a) y = a or (i.b)
y = c.
Similarly, comparing r and pac yields either (ii.a) z = a or (ii.b) z = b.
We next compare p and pab . These profiles differ for the agents in Y , who
have dips b in p and dips ab in p
ab . By going from b to ab only the perpendicular
bisector ℓa,b is crossed. By Lemma 3.5, as before the first change in preference
from below must be a swap between ϕ(p) = x and ϕ(pab) = y, but this implies
that ℓx,y coincides with ℓa,b. Therefore, we now have either (iii.a) x = y or
(iii.b) x 6= y and σa,b(x) = y.
Similarly, comparing p and pac yields either (iv.a) x = z or (iv.b) x 6= z and
σa,c(x) = z.
If x = y or x = z, then (i) or (ii) implies that x ∈ {a, b, c}. Let x 6= y, x 6= z.
Then σa,b(x) = y and σa,c(x) = z by (iii.b) and (iv.b). Since a, b, c are distinct
and thus ℓa,b 6= ℓa,c it follows that z 6= y. If y = a or z = a, then σa,b(x) = y
and σa,c(x) = z imply x = b or x = c, hence we are done again. So, assume
y 6= a and z 6= a, then y = c by (i.b) and z = b by (ii.b). Then by (iii.b) and
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(iv.b) we have σa,b(x) = y = c and σa,c(x) = z = b. We now assume a 6= x
and derive a contradiction, which will complete the proof of the Claim. Since
σa,c(a) = c and σa,b(a) = b the assumption a 6= x implies that a, b, c and x are
vertices of a rectangle. (See Fig. 3(b).) To derive the contradiction it is, in view
of condition (ii) in the lemma, sufficient to prove that x ∈ B. Let d ∈ b(Ra),
hence d /∈ {a, b, c}, with d 6= x. We will show that m ∈ ℓx,d. This implies that
a, x, and d are on the same circle with center m. Since a and x are on the same
diameter in this circle we have that ||d−a|| < ||x−a||, contradicting d ∈ b(Ra).
So a ∈ Ax, hence x ∈ B.
We are left to show that m ∈ ℓx,d. Suppose, to the contrary, that m /∈ ℓx,d.
Since d ∈ b(Ra) we have a ∈ H(ℓx,d, x), hence m ∈ H
◦(ℓx,d, x) and therefore
b, c ∈ H◦(ℓx,d, x) by the choice of these points (note that these points can be
chosen close enough to m to achieve this, given that there are only finitely many
candidates for the points x and d). By the choice of a˜, also a˜ ∈ H◦(ℓx,d, x).
But this implies that d Pareto dominates x at profile p, contradicting ϕ(p) = x.
This completes the proof of the Claim.
Consider the profile p′ = (cX , b
Y
, cZ). Since X ∪ Z is decisive we have that
ϕ(p′) = c. Strategy-proofness and the Claim now imply that x = ϕ(p) = c.
Next we prove that ϕ(pac) = z ∈ {a, b}. Note that z ∈ C. Because of
ϕ(r) = a, strategy-proofness implies that z is weakly preferred to a at Rb. So,
z ∈ {a, b}.
Let p′′ = (b
X
, b
Y
, aZc ). Since X ∪ Y is decisive we have ϕ(p
′′) = b. Then
strategy-proofness implies ϕ(pac) = z = b. Since ϕ(p) = c, coalition Z can
manipulate from pac to p, violating strategy-proofness.
Before continuing with the main result of this section a consideration of the
polytopes to which the preceding lemmas apply is in order. First, let |C| = 3,
i.e., A is a triangle including its interior. If this triangle is acute then B = C,
hence |B| = 3 and also condition (ii) of Lemma 3.9 is trivially satisfied. If this
triangle is not acute, however, then |B| = 2 and this case will be studied in the
next section. Second, let |C| > 3. If |B| = 2, which means, roughly, that the
polytope A is rather flat, then again the results in the next section apply. For
cases where |B| ≥ 3 we provide an exact characterization of those polytopes
where condition (ii) of Lemma 3.9 is not satisfied. We start with an auxiliary
lemma.
Lemma 3.10 Let |B| ≥ 3 and let a ∈ B. Then there are distinct b, c ∈ B \ {a}
such that ma,b,c ∈ A
◦ ∩ ∂Aa.
Proof. For any two distinct points x, y ∈ B \ {a}, we have ma,x,y ∈ A
◦ by
Lemma 3.3. Now, since B is finite there must be distinct b, c ∈ B\{a} such that
the set H◦(ℓa,b, b)∩H
◦(ℓa,c, b) contains no point of the form ma,x,y for distinct
x, y ∈ B \ {a} other than ma,b,c. We claim that H
◦(ℓa,b, b)∩H
◦(ℓa,c, c)∩A also
has empty intersection with ℓa,x for any x ∈ C\B. If not, then there is such an x
and a point xa ∈ H
◦(ℓa,b, b)∩H
◦(ℓa,c, b)∩H
◦(ℓa,x, x)∩A with Rxa = ax... and
such that Rσa,x(xa) = xa... But then σa,x(xa) ∈ Ax, so x ∈ B, a contradiction.
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It follows that H◦(ℓa,b, b) ∩H
◦(ℓa,c, b) ∩ A ⊆ Aa. Since ma,b,c = ℓa,b ∩ ℓa,c this
implies that ma,b,c ∈ Aa. Since, clearly, ma,b,c /∈ Aa we have ma,b,c ∈ ∂Aa.
The next lemma characterizes those polytopes where condition (ii) of Lemma
3.9 is not satisfied.
Lemma 3.11 Let |B| ≥ 3. Then condition (ii) in Lemma 3.9 does not hold if
and only if B is rectangular.
Proof. For the only-if direction, assume that condition (ii) in Lemma 3.9 does
not hold. We show that B is rectangular. The proof of this fact proceeds in a
few steps. We start with stating (without proof) the following useful fact.
Step 1 A set Q ⊆ R2 is an orthant if it is of the form Q = {p + λ1x
1 + λ2x
2 |
λ1, λ2 ≥ 0} for some p ∈ R
2 and some perpendicular vectors x1, x2 ∈ R2 \ {0}.
Denote p = p(Q). Let X be a compact and convex subset of R2 with non-empty
interior, written as X =
⋃
i∈I(Q
i ∩ X) where I is some index set, Qi is an
orthant with p(Qi) ∈ X◦ for each i ∈ I, and (Qj ∩X)◦ ∩ (Qk ∩X)◦ = ∅ for all
distinct j, k ∈ I. Then |I| = 4.
a b
xc
ℓ′
ℓa,c
ℓa,b
ℓa,z
ma,b,c
ŷ Q
Figure 4: Illustrating the proof of Lemma 3.11, Step 2
Step 2 Let a ∈ B and let b, c ∈ B \{a}, b 6= c, such that ma,b,c ∈ A
◦ ∩∂A. Since
condition (ii) in Lemma 3.9 does not hold, there is an x ∈ B such that {a, b, c, x}
is rectangular. Without loss of generality assume that ℓ(a, b) and ℓ(c, x), as well
as ℓ(a, c) and ℓ(b, x) are parallel. (See Fig. 4 for an illustration of the proof of
this step.) Denote Q = H(ℓa,b, x) ∩H(ℓa,c, x). Then Aa = Q
◦ ∩A.
In order to prove this claim, we first observe the following. Let y be any
point of Aa and let ℓ be the line through a and y. Then y
′ ∈ Aa for any point
y′ ∈ A on ℓ on the other side of y than a. Therefore, to prove our claim, it
is sufficient to prove that y ∈ ∂Aa for every y ∈ ∂Q ∩ A. Suppose this were
not true, without loss of generality suppose there is some point in ℓa,b ∩Q ∩ A
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which is not in ∂Aa. Then, since ma,b,c ∈ ∂Aa and since Aa is convex there is a
ŷ ∈ ℓa,b∩Q∩A such that [ma,b,c, ŷ] ⊆ ∂Aa and such that (ℓa,b∩Q)\[ma,b,c, ŷ] 6= ∅
but (ℓa,b ∩Q) \ [ma,b,c, ŷ] ∩Aa = ∅. Then there must be a z ∈ B such that ℓa,z
intersects ℓa,b at the point ŷ. Since, clearly, ŷ ∈ ∂Aa ∩A
◦ and condition (ii) in
Lemma 3.9 does not hold, there must be a v ∈ B such that the set {a, z, b, v}
is rectangular. This implies in particular that ℓa,z and ℓa,b are perpendicular.
But then y /∈ Aa for all y in Q
◦ ∩ A on the straight line ℓ′ through a and ŷ.
This is a contradiction with the observation at the beginning of the proof, since
ŷ ∈ ∂Aa. This completes the proof of the claim in Step 2.
Step 3 Let a ∈ B. Then the set Aa is the intersection of A with an orthant Qa
with p(Qa) ∈ A
◦.
To prove this, just note that by Lemma 3.10 there are b, c as in Step 2. The
claim of Step 3 now follows from Step 2.
We can now complete the proof of the only-if direction. By Step 3, for each
a ∈ B the set Aa is the intersection of A with an orthant Qa with p(Qa) ∈ A
◦.
Moreover, A =
⋃
a∈B Aa =
⋃
a∈B(Qa ∩ A). Hence by Step 1, |B| = 4, in
particular B = {a, b, c, x} with a, b, c, x as in Step 2. Thus, B is rectangular.
For the if-direction, let B be rectangular with B = {v, w, y, z}. Clearly,
among any three distinct points in {v, w, y, z} there is a point a such that
ma,b,c ∈ ∂Aa ∩ A
◦, where b and c are the other two points, but together with
the fourth point they form the rectangular set B. Hence, condition (ii) does not
hold.
We can now formulate the main result of this section. Call ϕ dictatorial if
there is a dictator, i.e., an agent d ∈ N such that ϕ(p) ∈ b(p(d)) for all p ∈ AN .
Theorem 3.12 If |B| ≥ 3 and B is not rectangular then ϕ is dictatorial.
Proof. By Lemmas 3.8, 3.9, and 3.11 the set of decisive coalitions is an ultra-
filter. Hence, by Lemma 2.2, there is a d ∈ N such that d is decisive. So ϕ is
dictatorial with dictator d.
We conclude this section with two remarks. The first remark is about regular
polytopes.
Remark 3.13 Call a polytope A in R2 regular if its extreme points – the ele-
ments of the set C – are the vertices of a regular polygon (equilateral triangle,
square, etc.). For such a regular polytope Theorem 3.12 implies that ϕ is dic-
tatorial if and only if |C| 6= 4. Thus, on regular polytopes A, a strategy-proof
and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial unless A is a square including its inside.
The second remark concerns a relation between the results of Gibbard (1973)
and Satterthwaite (1975) and Theorem 3.12.
Remark 3.14 Let C = {a, b, c} such that a, b, and c are the vertices of an
acute triangle. By Theorem 3.12 any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule
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on A must be a dictatorship. An alternative proof of this fact could work as
follows. Let ϕ be such a rule and first prove that ϕ(p) ∈ C for every p ∈ AN .
Then, effectively, ϕ is a strategy-proof and Pareto optimal social choice function
on the set C of alternatives, with full domain of preferences, as can be seen in
Fig. 5(a), where the perpendicular bisectors of the edges are drawn. Hence, ϕ
must be a dictatorship according to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. If the
triangle is not acute then only four strict preferences are generated (Fig. 5(b))
and thus the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem does not apply. Indeed, in this
case, if the right or obtuse angle is at c, then a and b are the only single-best
points, and for instance majority voting between a and b is a strategy-proof and
Pareto optimal rule.
a b
c
a b
c
cba cab
bca acb
bac abc
bca acbbac abc
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Remark 3.14
4 Nondictatorship
In this section we study the two cases excluded in Theorem 3.12, namely the
case |B| = 2 and the case where B is rectangular.
4.1 |B| = 2
According to Theorem 3.12 dictatorship is implied by Pareto optimality and
strategy-proofness under two conditions on the set B of single-best alternatives
in C. In this section we consider the case where the first one of these conditions
does not hold. More precisely, we assume that |B| = 2, and write B = {a, b}.
The following lemma reveals a consequence of this assumption. It says that the
center of the circle through a, b, and any other point c ∈ C cannot be an interior
point of A.
Lemma 4.1 Let c ∈ A \ {a, b}. Then ma,b,c /∈ A
◦.
Proof. First observe that for any B ⊆ C with |B| ≥ 2 we have that AB , if
not empty, consists of a line segment (which may happen if |B| = 2) or a single
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point. This implies that any open subset of A◦ has a non-empty intersection
with Aa or Ab. Now suppose ma,b,c ∈ A
◦. Then the set (V ◦cab ∪ V
◦
cba) ∩ A
◦,
where Vcab = {x ∈ A : (c, a), (a, b) ∈ Rx} and Vcba = {x ∈ A : (c, b), (b, a) ∈
Rx}, is an open subset of A
◦. However, Aa ∩ (V
◦
cab ∪ V
◦
cba) ∩ A
◦ = ∅ and
Ab ∩ (V
◦
cab ∪ Vcba)
◦ ∩A◦ = ∅. This is a contradiction, hence ma,b,c /∈ A
◦.
For the remainder of this section let again ϕ be a Pareto optimal and
strategy-proof rule. We first show that in almost all cases we have ϕ(p) ∈ {a, b}.
Lemma 4.2 Let p ∈ AN , p 6= mNa,b,c for all c ∈ C\{a, b}. Then ϕ(p) ∈ {a, b}.
Proof. To the contrary suppose ϕ(p) /∈ {a, b}. We write m for ma,b,ϕ(p) if a, b,
and ϕ(p) are not collinear; otherwise, ϕ(p) ∈]a, b[ and we takem = ϕ(p). (Below
it will follow that ϕ(p) ∈ ∂A, so that in view of Lemma 3.1 the latter case will
actually not occur.) For every i ∈ N with p(i) /∈ {a, b,m} we have by Lemma 4.1
that ||p(i)−ϕ(p)|| < ||p(i)−a|| or ||p(i)−ϕ(p)|| < ||p(i)−b||. If ||p(i)−ϕ(p)|| <
||p(i) − a|| for some i ∈ N , then consider the profile p′ with p′(i) = b and
p′(j) = p(j) for all j 6= i. If ϕ(p′) = b then agent i would manipulate from p′ to
p since ϕ(p) 6= b, and if ϕ(p′) = a then agent i would manipulate from p to p′.
Hence, strategy-proofness implies ϕ(p′) /∈ {a, b}. If ||p(i) − ϕ(p)|| < ||p(i) − b||
for some i ∈ N then we consider the profile p′′ with p′′(i) = a and p′′(j) = p(j)
for all j 6= i and similarly derive that ϕ(p′′) /∈ {a, b}. Therefore we may assume
that p(N) ⊆ {a, b,m}. Since p(N) ⊆ {a, b} would contradict Lemma 3.6 we
may further assume that p is of the form p = (aS , bT ,mV ) for some coalitions
S, T , and V = N \ (S ∪ T ) 6= ∅. By Pareto optimality we have that either S
and T are non-empty or V = N .
Suppose that ϕ(p) ∈ A◦. Then there are points of A on the straight line
through ϕ(p) perpendicular to ℓ(a, b) that Pareto dominate ϕ(p) given the profile
p, contradicting Pareto optimality of ϕ. Hence, ϕ(p) ∈ ∂A, so that ϕ(p) ∈ C
by Lemma 3.1. Thus, by the condition on p in the lemma, V 6= N , so that
S, T, V 6= ∅.
Next, let a = ma,ϕ(p) and consider profile p
a = (aS , bT ,mV ). We prove
that ϕ(pa) = a. (See Fig. 6 for an illustration of this part of the argument.) By
comparing p and pa, strategy-proofness implies that ||ϕ(pa)−a|| ≥ ||ϕ(p)−a|| =
||a − a|| and ||ϕ(p) − a|| ≥ ||ϕ(pa) − a||. Consider the profile q = (aS , bT∪V ).
Note that b ∈ Aa; also, since by Lemma 4.1, ma,b,c /∈ A
◦ and ma,b,c ∈ ℓa,b for
all c ∈ A \ {a, b}, it follows that a ∈ Ab. Now Lemma 3.6 implies ϕ(q) ∈ {a, b},
hence strategy-proofness yields ||m−a|| = ||m−b|| ≤ ||m−ϕ(pa)||. This means
that ϕ(pa) is not inside the circle with center m through the points a, b and
ϕ(p), but then ϕ(pa) must be on this circle since there are no points of A outside
this circle (since otherwise we could find a point in B different from a and b, a
contradiction). Hence, ||m−a|| = ||m−ϕ(pa)||. Since ||ϕ(p)−a|| ≥ ||ϕ(pa)−a||,
||ϕ(pa) − a|| ≥ ||a − a|| and ||m − a|| = ||m − ϕ(pa)|| it follows that either
ϕ(pa) = ϕ(p) or ϕ(pa) is on the circle with center m through a and ϕ(p) on
the arc between a and b not containing ϕ(p). The latter case, however, implies
ϕ(pa) = a since there cannot be points of C on this arc other than a or b. Hence,
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ma b
ϕ(p)
ℓa,ϕ(p) ℓb,ϕ(p)
a ⊙(m, ||a−m||)⊙(a, ||ϕ(p)− a||)
⊙(a, ||a− a||)
Figure 6: Illustrating the proof of Lemma 4.2
ϕ(pa) ∈ {a, ϕ(p)}. But ϕ(p) is Pareto dominated by a at the profile pa. So,
ϕ(pa) = a.
Now let b = mb,ϕ(p) and consider the profile p
ab = (aS , b
T
,mV ). Note that
b ∈ H◦(ℓa,b, b). Similarly as above we have b ∈ Aa. Therefore ϕ(p
ab) = a by
strategy-proofness.
By an analogous argument but now starting with the profile pb =
(aS , b
T
,mV ), we obtain pab = b, a contradiction which completes the proof.
In order to characterize all strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules while
avoiding technicalities due to preference indifferences, we make the following
additional assumptions. The first assumption takes care of the cases not covered
by Lemma 4.2. More precisely, suppose ma,b,c ∈ A for some c ∈ C \{a, b}. Then
by Lemma 4.1 we must have ma,b,c ∈ {m,m}, where {m,m} = ∂A ∩ ℓa,b.
Assumption 4.3 ϕ(p) ∈ {a, b} for p = mN and p = mN .
The second assumption, which is a version of the familiar non-bossiness con-
dition, guarantees that indifferent agents cannot change the assigned alternative.
Assumption 4.4 For all i ∈ N and p, q ∈ AN such that p(j) = q(j) for all
j ∈ N \ {i}, if ||p(i) − a|| = ||p(i) − b|| and ||q(i) − a|| = ||q(i) − b||, then
ϕ(p) = ϕ(q).
With these additional assumptions, it is straightforward to verify that (a
strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule) ϕ depends only on the individual pref-
erences between a and b and not on the exact location of the dips. We will now
develop a precise description of ϕ.
Let Wϕa be the set of pairs (S,U) ∈ N × N with S ∩ U = ∅ and such that
ϕ(p) = a for all profiles p with a single-best for all agents in S and both a and b
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best for all agents in U . Let Wϕb be defined analogously. Since ϕ depends only
on the individual preferences between a and b we have that the pair (Wϕa ,W
ϕ
b ) is
both proper and strong, i.e., either (S,U) ∈ Wϕa or (T,U) ∈ W
ϕ
b for all pairwise
disjoint sets S, U and T with S∪T ∪U = N . Pareto-optimality of ϕ implies that
the pair (Wϕa ,W
ϕ
b ) is Pareto optimal, i.e., (S,U) ∈ W
ϕ
a if S 6= ∅ and S∪U = N ,
and (T,U) ∈ Wϕb if T 6= ∅ and T ∪ U = N . Furthermore, strategy-proofness
of ϕ implies that the pair (Wϕa ,W
ϕ
b ) is monotone, i.e., (S
′, U ′) ∈ Wϕa whenever
(S,U) ∈ Wϕa and S ⊆ S
′ and S ∪ U ⊆ S′ ∪ U ′ and (T ′, U ′) ∈ Wϕb whenever
(T,U) ∈ Wϕb and T ⊆ T
′ and T∪U ⊆ T ′∪U ′. It is straightforward to check that
any proper and strong, Pareto optimal and monotone pair (Wa,Wb) defines a
Pareto optimal and strategy-proof rule ϕ, satisfying Assumptions 4.3 and 4.4,
with (Wϕa ,W
ϕ
b ) = (Wa,Wb). We summarize these findings in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.5 Let B = {a, b} with a 6= b. Then
(i) If ϕ is strategy-proof, Pareto optimal, and satisfies Assumptions 4.3 and
4.4, then (Wϕa ,W
ϕ
b ) is proper and strong, Pareto optimal and monotone.
(ii) If (Wa,Wb) is proper and strong, Pareto optimal and monotone, then there
is a strategy-proof, and Pareto optimal rule ϕ, satisfying Assumptions 4.3
and 4.4, such that Wa =W
ϕ
a and Wb =W
ϕ
b .
4.2 B is rectangular
In this section we consider the case where B is rectangular. Thus, we assume
that B = {a, b, c, d} and that [a, b], [b, c], [c, d], and [d, a] are the edges of a
rectangle. Rather than attempting to describe all strategy-proof and Pareto
efficient rules for this case – which becomes a very technical exercise mainly
due to many tie-breaking decisions that have to be made – we content ourselves
with giving a typical example of a rule.5
a
d
b
c
e v
h
Figure 7: Illustrating Example 4.6
5An early draft of this paper contains a complete characterization of all such rules under
some additional assumptions.
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Example 4.6 (Cf. Fig 7.) Let h be the common perpendicular bisector of [a, d]
and [b, c] and let v be the common perpendicular bisector of [a, b] and [c, d]. For
every profile p define ϕ(p) as follows. If |{i ∈ N : p(i) ∈ H(h, a)}| ≥ |{i ∈ N :
p(i) ∈ H(h, d)}| then ϕ(p) ∈ {c, d} and if |{i ∈ N : p(i) ∈ H(h, a)}| < |{i ∈
N : p(i) ∈ H(h, d)}| then ϕ(p) ∈ {a, b}. If |{i ∈ N : p(i) ∈ H(v, a)}| ≥ |{i ∈
N : p(i) ∈ H(v, b)}| then ϕ(p) ∈ {b, c} and if |{i ∈ N : p(i) ∈ H(v, a)}| < |{i ∈
N : p(i) ∈ H(v, b)}| then ϕ(p) ∈ {a, d}. In words, we let majority voting decide
between {a, b} and {c, d} on the one hand, and between {a, d} and {b, c} on the
other. It can be proved (left to the reader) that this rule is strategy-proof and
Pareto optimal.
5 Concluding remarks
The preceding sections naturally lead to the question if the obtained results can
be extended to other regions, such as general compact convex sets. Since some
of the proofs seem to rely heavily on the finiteness of the set of extreme points,
this question does not appear to have a straightforward answer. In a companion
note (O¨ztu¨rk, Peters, and Storcken, 2012) we show that the dictatorship result
extends to the disc (circle and its inside) in R2. This result may not come as a
surprise in view of the fact the the disc can be seen as the ‘limit’ of polytopes for
which Theorem 3.12 implies dictatorship, but nevertheless we need a separate
proof to show this.
Another potential extension concerns the domain of preferences. One might
expect, however, that allowing for a richer class of single-dipped preferences,
other than only Euclidean, is bound to result in dictatorship.
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